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Coach D's Defensive Scheme
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It's called the read and retract.
I am glad you started a thread on this. I am starting to become convinced this is the reason we cannot or are not attracting top flight DTs. I think it is the reason Marcus Forston left early. Im not buying the BS that Drew Rosenhaus jedi mind tricked him into thinking he would be a 1-3 round pick. I think he saw the new system would not benefit his talents and left.
I think it is the reason we couldnt hang onto Keith Bryant too and that we struck out on every big time DT target we had on the board this year. (Hooks, Bryant, Bostwick, Brooks, etc) I think these rival defensive coaches like Odell Haggins are popping in tapes of our DT schemes and using it against us. Lets not forget that Luther Robinson was almost benched against BC because he was going after QB! (And I was thinking buddy was ballin! Not knowing that he was totally f'ing up. smh.)
I have no answers. Doesnt ALA run the same type of scheme? And they get DT out the a$$. Maybe if we prove that the scheme can work and you can make it the NFL we can attract more DTs.
Am I looking too much into this?
I think it is the reason we couldnt hang onto Keith Bryant too and that we struck out on every big time DT target we had on the board this year. (Hooks, Bryant, Bostwick, Brooks, etc) I think these rival defensive coaches like Odell Haggins are popping in tapes of our DT schemes and using it against us. Lets not forget that Luther Robinson was almost benched against BC because he was going after QB! (And I was thinking buddy was ballin! Not knowing that he was totally f'ing up. smh.)
I have no answers. Doesnt ALA run the same type of scheme? And they get DT out the a$$. Maybe if we prove that the scheme can work and you can make it the NFL we can attract more DTs.
Am I looking too much into this?
NorthFlaCane
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The NCAA investigation is what poisoned the well with Bryant
bransuperpower
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people can you please stop acting like the big cloud (sanction) are not hanging over us just because we feel like its over don’t mean recruits feel the same and when they take visits to places like Alabama, Florida, FL state, or lsu and see those bowl games they went to they don’t think "hey i can play for Miami and just play the regular season" it’s not that its guaranteed it’s the fact that we don’t know and they don’t either so some don’t take the chance especially JUCO they only have 2 years and they need bowl games for the NFL
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FlipT
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It worked at Temple because that isn't a football area and the kids are more prone to give in to his coaching. South Florida is the Mecca of hs football and kids down there usually want to play in an attacking scheme. These is a complex scheme and I feel it shouldn't be ran in college, but it would be ok to run variations of the defense. There is a reason the Patriots can only get certain people to play in their scheme, yet Baltimore/Pittsburgh can plug in guys fresh out of college and they can mesh pretty quickly.This is Parcells defense and it can only be special if it has an elite pass rusher(LT,Ware,Jason Taylor for Saban), so I'll give AG this year to see if he has a Meast coming off the corner that can help the defense overall.
Bransuperpower, sorry cane bro, but Im not buying the sanctions crap anymore either. You do realize that there is a VERY good chance that by the end of this month we could have 3 of the top 25 players in the country committed to us, right? (Yearby, KC and maybe Sony)
Boston_Cane
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No offense intended but I think this is stupid. You really think Keith Bryant or Moten or Hooks were sitting there thinking "I'd commit to Miami on the spot if they played more man-press coverage or blitzed more out of a hybrid 3-4 look. Oh well, I'm not gonna fall for the old banana in the tailpipe." C'mon man.
bransuperpower
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im not saying im 100% correct but there are hundreds of kids @rb, wr, or corner that can be very-elite for the Dt position if your not elite there isnt much use for you, and we dont do a very good job at out of state recuiting outside of last year (which is crazy to me)
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Cool, this **** again
There was a poster either here on Cane Insiders that had a beautiful technical break down of the scheme going back to Bill Parcels who actually developed it. So you may have to dig for it, I think its about a year old.
As for the scheme working at Temple, look Coach Donfrio at temple was not playing against Top FBS talent and certainly was game planning against top Offensive minds hello the MAC doesn't really come to mind when I think explosive or innovative offensive schemes. Also think about like this which is also VERY SCARY the last 3 years at Temple Al Golden had the to rated recruiting classes in the conference and they also had the largest football budget so in essence all the other teams in the conference where out matched and out spent. Yet Temple never won the MAC conference, the just posted winning records. So if defense wins championships an supposedly Donfrio had the top ranked defense in the MAC, where are the rings. The bend but don't break defense kept them in games, and then the offense ran the ball to shorten the game an that formula kept them in games an even won a few games for them against garbage teams. Now against the 2 major FBS teams they played in PSU & UCONN they kept the games close to a certain extent but in the end they where out classed by Paterno and Edstall.
The problem is that AG is not willing to get into D'Onfrio's kool aid and make him be more creative as well as understand he has better athletes an can accordingly adjust his schemes. At Temple they played the same 10yd's off zone rather then half man and attack from the field. This is why premier DT's don't want to play in his system. And these coachs are still trying to sell the UM history at DT, but it is a completely different style of play an the kids know it. So initially they get caught up in the U mystic but after that wears off an they get deeper into actual X's & O's analysis they see the scheme for what it is, and stats don't lie (bottom 100's in defense).
Then throw in that Jethro Franklin is not holding his water as a coach or recruiter, there is a reason when he left NFL and the only job he could get was at TEMPLE after having coached at USC & for several NFL TEAMS. Seriously ask that question why go an coach at Temple if your sooooo good, it **** sure wasn't the money. Now for AG he probably thought yeah I having a feeling he may not be a technically sound DL Coach (as evident of him changing jobs every 1 - 2 years, if your a killer Dline coach the HC will move heaven and earth to keep you) but his pedigree can help us recruit some better players.
So a few remedies I can see are AG sitting down with Donfrio and having a come to jesus type meeting about adjusting his defense an philosophy, then going out an hiring Kevin Patrick to coach DLine at UM. Instantly overnight UM's DT recruiting will get a shot in the arm.
Go Canes!
Here is a break of Bill Parcell's 3-4 Scheme which is what D'Onfrio models his after
http://www.bloggingtheboys.com/2012/3/13/2866624/cowboys-defense-how-does-3-4-work-part-1-bill-parcells
As for the scheme working at Temple, look Coach Donfrio at temple was not playing against Top FBS talent and certainly was game planning against top Offensive minds hello the MAC doesn't really come to mind when I think explosive or innovative offensive schemes. Also think about like this which is also VERY SCARY the last 3 years at Temple Al Golden had the to rated recruiting classes in the conference and they also had the largest football budget so in essence all the other teams in the conference where out matched and out spent. Yet Temple never won the MAC conference, the just posted winning records. So if defense wins championships an supposedly Donfrio had the top ranked defense in the MAC, where are the rings. The bend but don't break defense kept them in games, and then the offense ran the ball to shorten the game an that formula kept them in games an even won a few games for them against garbage teams. Now against the 2 major FBS teams they played in PSU & UCONN they kept the games close to a certain extent but in the end they where out classed by Paterno and Edstall.
The problem is that AG is not willing to get into D'Onfrio's kool aid and make him be more creative as well as understand he has better athletes an can accordingly adjust his schemes. At Temple they played the same 10yd's off zone rather then half man and attack from the field. This is why premier DT's don't want to play in his system. And these coachs are still trying to sell the UM history at DT, but it is a completely different style of play an the kids know it. So initially they get caught up in the U mystic but after that wears off an they get deeper into actual X's & O's analysis they see the scheme for what it is, and stats don't lie (bottom 100's in defense).
Then throw in that Jethro Franklin is not holding his water as a coach or recruiter, there is a reason when he left NFL and the only job he could get was at TEMPLE after having coached at USC & for several NFL TEAMS. Seriously ask that question why go an coach at Temple if your sooooo good, it **** sure wasn't the money. Now for AG he probably thought yeah I having a feeling he may not be a technically sound DL Coach (as evident of him changing jobs every 1 - 2 years, if your a killer Dline coach the HC will move heaven and earth to keep you) but his pedigree can help us recruit some better players.
So a few remedies I can see are AG sitting down with Donfrio and having a come to jesus type meeting about adjusting his defense an philosophy, then going out an hiring Kevin Patrick to coach DLine at UM. Instantly overnight UM's DT recruiting will get a shot in the arm.
Go Canes!
Here is a break of Bill Parcell's 3-4 Scheme which is what D'Onfrio models his after
http://www.bloggingtheboys.com/2012/3/13/2866624/cowboys-defense-how-does-3-4-work-part-1-bill-parcells
Last edited:
Port Knox
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I was thinkin more like read and retreat!
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Coach Macho
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I don't think he's referring to coverage schemes, he's referring to the style of scheme we play on the D-line.
Lol. We could argue about this all day. We are just gonna have to agree to disagree. But the proof is in the eating. DT is the ONLY position where we have consistantly struck out at in the Golden era. **** we dont even strike out at DE as much!! Which is SHOCKING!
The Standard 3-4
As designed, Bill Parcells' defense was a conservative yet incredibly powerful scheme. It's key tenets were gap integrity from the defensive line and flexibility from the linebackers. It did not, believe it or not, revolve around the weak-side outside linebacker, standing up in the 9-technique, rushing the quarterback on every snap. Instead, it employed very basic blitzes and coverages, and relied on the defensive personnel to execute their assignments in a read-and-react fashion.
The Personnel:
Parcells' defense required a very specific set of players. Although he was not against utilizing superior, if not prototypical, players, his drafting history showed a tendency to go after specific body types.
Nose Tackle:
Everything starts up front. With a 3-4 defense, this is especially true. Think about football in general; there are 11 men on the field. Players typically come in sets of 2, on defense, but the player that you only have one of is the most important, as only he can execute his responsibilities. The nose tackle is meant to be a short, thick, beastly force of nature. Look for 6' to 6'4, and 320+ pounds. Emphasis on the plus.
Defensive End:
Nearly as important to Bill (who wanted to draft Marcus Spears instead of DeMarcus Ware, rather than after), the Defensive Ends are vital components to a successful 3-4. They are intended to be so dominant that a Tackle can not consistently block them 1-on-1. 6'4 - 6'7, 280-330(!) pounds.
Inside Linebacker:
Parcells made Bar...er...Mr. Carpenter a first-round draft choice. He also selected Bradie James (a fixture until last year) and acquired Akin Ayodele to play in this position. The inside 'backer should be able to drop into coverage with the safeties, but also beat a Guard's block in the run game. 6'1 - 6'4, 240-265 pounds.
Outside Linebacker:
The position played by arguably the best player on our roster, outside linebacker demands incredible versatility. Not only are the 3-4 OLBs intended to replace the 4-3 DEs in the pass-rushing department, but they are also supposed to supplant the 4-3 OLBs capabilities as rangy coverage and pursuit guys. You're demanding the size of a lineman with the athleticism of a linebacker. 6'4 - 6'7, 250-280 pounds.
Safeties:
If you asked Roy Williams (the relevant one) what he thought of the 3-4 system Parcells implemented, the result might not be safe for work. Originally drafted as an attacking, in-the-box safety, Williams was forced, in the new scheme, to play coverage nearly as often, and nearly as effectively as his partner at free safety. For both, versatility (coverage, blitzing) is critical.
Cornerbacks:
Aside from Terence Newman (I promise he was good back then), Parcells didn't have much to work with in the secondary. As shown in the diagram (the headline image), Newman's style of giving receivers a big cushion is standard in the "real" 3-4. The idea is to sit back in coverage and jump the routes that come your way, while forcing receivers to the safeties and linebackers. Speed is key here, as well as ball skills and route recognition.
The Assignments:
Nose Tackle:
As the man in the middle, the Nose Tackle lines up in the 0-technique (over the Center). His jobs are to push the Center back into the quarterback/developing play, force assistance from a Guard in completing the block against him, and disengage the Center in order to tackle any runners in either A Gap.
Defensive End:
Similar in concept to the nose tackle, DEs share many of the same responsibilities. They are still asked to create opportunities for their men by drawing double teams. Also, they are expected to maintain two gaps each--their respective B and C gaps--in run defense.
Inside Linebacker:
The ILB begins in a rather precarious position, which Parcells called the "Bubble." The Bubble is the position in front of an uncovered Guard, and it's precarious because Guard's are big, mean, and nasty. If, for some reason, a Guard is able to break off of a double team, the ILB has to fight off that block and stop the run. If not, the ILB makes a run/pass read and either drops into coverage or waits near the line of scrimmage.
Outside Linebacker:
In the "real" 3-4, OLBs play off the line of scrimmage. While they are still primary blitz options, they are also intended to be sufficiently competent in coverage as to force the quarterback to account for them possibly playing zones. This is where the original element of mystery comes from with the 3-4. Which OLB is blitzing? It doesn't get much more suspenseful than that. Or, at least, not until we get to Rob's scheme.
Safeties:
The safeties are occasional blitzers in the 3-4. The primary difference from the 4-3 or 46 is that, in the 3-4, either safety is equally likely to blitz, as they are utilized interchangeably. Conversely, one or the other is equally likely to be covering, and, at times, both or neither will be playing the deep zones.3-4 safeties provide little run support, as they are frequently asked to drop deep. The wealth of linebackers is expected to mitigate this facet of the game.
Cornerbacks:
Corners, as we see all year, are primarily tasked with covering an opposing receiver one-on-one. The "real" 3-4 employs little press coverage, as they prefer to keep their assignments in given alignments ambiguous. The depth of the corners is such that, if need be, a quarters zone can easily be called from the base defense, accounting for an unexpectedly high number of receivers spread out wide, and linebackers spreading out underneath or blitzing.
The Implementation:
The NT attacks the Center, drawing a double team from the strong-side Guard. The DEs attack their respective Tackles. The weak-side DE is doubled by the Tackle and Guard, while the strong-side DE is doubled by the Tackle and Tight End/Fullback. The ILBs read the play without fear of being blocked and drop into coverage. The corners force their receivers' routes inside as much as possible. The safeties, seeing the ILBs in coverage, work to prevent the deep ball. The strong-side OLB rushes the edge, and covers the back if he should get the ball or release on a route. The weak-side OLB rushes the QB, unblocked (as the weak-side Tackle is blocking the DE), and completes the sack (or forces the throw into solid zone coverage, a likely interception).
There are also several contingencies. If a DE or DT loses an O-Lineman, the ILB must get position to make the stop regardless of the lineman's location. In that case, there will be one less ILB in coverage, and the safeties will adjust appropriately. Additionally, if a CB gets beaten deep, the same-side safety must assume responsibility for that receiver.
As designed, Bill Parcells' defense was a conservative yet incredibly powerful scheme. It's key tenets were gap integrity from the defensive line and flexibility from the linebackers. It did not, believe it or not, revolve around the weak-side outside linebacker, standing up in the 9-technique, rushing the quarterback on every snap. Instead, it employed very basic blitzes and coverages, and relied on the defensive personnel to execute their assignments in a read-and-react fashion.
The Personnel:
Parcells' defense required a very specific set of players. Although he was not against utilizing superior, if not prototypical, players, his drafting history showed a tendency to go after specific body types.
Nose Tackle:
Everything starts up front. With a 3-4 defense, this is especially true. Think about football in general; there are 11 men on the field. Players typically come in sets of 2, on defense, but the player that you only have one of is the most important, as only he can execute his responsibilities. The nose tackle is meant to be a short, thick, beastly force of nature. Look for 6' to 6'4, and 320+ pounds. Emphasis on the plus.
Defensive End:
Nearly as important to Bill (who wanted to draft Marcus Spears instead of DeMarcus Ware, rather than after), the Defensive Ends are vital components to a successful 3-4. They are intended to be so dominant that a Tackle can not consistently block them 1-on-1. 6'4 - 6'7, 280-330(!) pounds.
Inside Linebacker:
Parcells made Bar...er...Mr. Carpenter a first-round draft choice. He also selected Bradie James (a fixture until last year) and acquired Akin Ayodele to play in this position. The inside 'backer should be able to drop into coverage with the safeties, but also beat a Guard's block in the run game. 6'1 - 6'4, 240-265 pounds.
Outside Linebacker:
The position played by arguably the best player on our roster, outside linebacker demands incredible versatility. Not only are the 3-4 OLBs intended to replace the 4-3 DEs in the pass-rushing department, but they are also supposed to supplant the 4-3 OLBs capabilities as rangy coverage and pursuit guys. You're demanding the size of a lineman with the athleticism of a linebacker. 6'4 - 6'7, 250-280 pounds.
Safeties:
If you asked Roy Williams (the relevant one) what he thought of the 3-4 system Parcells implemented, the result might not be safe for work. Originally drafted as an attacking, in-the-box safety, Williams was forced, in the new scheme, to play coverage nearly as often, and nearly as effectively as his partner at free safety. For both, versatility (coverage, blitzing) is critical.
Cornerbacks:
Aside from Terence Newman (I promise he was good back then), Parcells didn't have much to work with in the secondary. As shown in the diagram (the headline image), Newman's style of giving receivers a big cushion is standard in the "real" 3-4. The idea is to sit back in coverage and jump the routes that come your way, while forcing receivers to the safeties and linebackers. Speed is key here, as well as ball skills and route recognition.
The Assignments:
Nose Tackle:
As the man in the middle, the Nose Tackle lines up in the 0-technique (over the Center). His jobs are to push the Center back into the quarterback/developing play, force assistance from a Guard in completing the block against him, and disengage the Center in order to tackle any runners in either A Gap.
Defensive End:
Similar in concept to the nose tackle, DEs share many of the same responsibilities. They are still asked to create opportunities for their men by drawing double teams. Also, they are expected to maintain two gaps each--their respective B and C gaps--in run defense.
Inside Linebacker:
The ILB begins in a rather precarious position, which Parcells called the "Bubble." The Bubble is the position in front of an uncovered Guard, and it's precarious because Guard's are big, mean, and nasty. If, for some reason, a Guard is able to break off of a double team, the ILB has to fight off that block and stop the run. If not, the ILB makes a run/pass read and either drops into coverage or waits near the line of scrimmage.
Outside Linebacker:
In the "real" 3-4, OLBs play off the line of scrimmage. While they are still primary blitz options, they are also intended to be sufficiently competent in coverage as to force the quarterback to account for them possibly playing zones. This is where the original element of mystery comes from with the 3-4. Which OLB is blitzing? It doesn't get much more suspenseful than that. Or, at least, not until we get to Rob's scheme.
Safeties:
The safeties are occasional blitzers in the 3-4. The primary difference from the 4-3 or 46 is that, in the 3-4, either safety is equally likely to blitz, as they are utilized interchangeably. Conversely, one or the other is equally likely to be covering, and, at times, both or neither will be playing the deep zones.3-4 safeties provide little run support, as they are frequently asked to drop deep. The wealth of linebackers is expected to mitigate this facet of the game.
Cornerbacks:
Corners, as we see all year, are primarily tasked with covering an opposing receiver one-on-one. The "real" 3-4 employs little press coverage, as they prefer to keep their assignments in given alignments ambiguous. The depth of the corners is such that, if need be, a quarters zone can easily be called from the base defense, accounting for an unexpectedly high number of receivers spread out wide, and linebackers spreading out underneath or blitzing.
The Implementation:
The NT attacks the Center, drawing a double team from the strong-side Guard. The DEs attack their respective Tackles. The weak-side DE is doubled by the Tackle and Guard, while the strong-side DE is doubled by the Tackle and Tight End/Fullback. The ILBs read the play without fear of being blocked and drop into coverage. The corners force their receivers' routes inside as much as possible. The safeties, seeing the ILBs in coverage, work to prevent the deep ball. The strong-side OLB rushes the edge, and covers the back if he should get the ball or release on a route. The weak-side OLB rushes the QB, unblocked (as the weak-side Tackle is blocking the DE), and completes the sack (or forces the throw into solid zone coverage, a likely interception).
There are also several contingencies. If a DE or DT loses an O-Lineman, the ILB must get position to make the stop regardless of the lineman's location. In that case, there will be one less ILB in coverage, and the safeties will adjust appropriately. Additionally, if a CB gets beaten deep, the same-side safety must assume responsibility for that receiver.
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NVA CANE
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lulz.
Coach Macho
aka Beardy Ryan
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The ONLY thing that makes me wonder if our D-line scheme is an issue is the fact that we're able to sign top-flight recruits at CB, Safety and LB but we can't sign any top-flight D-linemen. That's really odd to me.
Most of the D-linemen in Florida are used to playing an aggressive one-gap style, using their speed and disrupting things in the backfield. That's all everybody does in high school. When they get to Miami they're being told to engage, read-and-react, etc etc etc. In my opinion it's not a favorable scheme for college. Bama can do it cause they're Bama, they recruit D-linemen who are grown men out of high school. Just cause Bama can succeed with it doesn't mean Miami can. I guess we'll see.
I worked with a guy who used to coach Olivier Vernon and he told me that the scheme was part of the reason he left early.
Most of the D-linemen in Florida are used to playing an aggressive one-gap style, using their speed and disrupting things in the backfield. That's all everybody does in high school. When they get to Miami they're being told to engage, read-and-react, etc etc etc. In my opinion it's not a favorable scheme for college. Bama can do it cause they're Bama, they recruit D-linemen who are grown men out of high school. Just cause Bama can succeed with it doesn't mean Miami can. I guess we'll see.
I worked with a guy who used to coach Olivier Vernon and he told me that the scheme was part of the reason he left early.
This article sums up what we UM is going through now with D'Onfrio. 8-(
In looking over the Cowboys' decision to replace Rob Ryan with Monte Kiffin, it is clear that Ryan's 3-4, and his method of implementing it, wasn't totally in line with the way that Jason Garrett wants to conduct business. More importantly, it appears Kiffin's 4-3 may represent a key adaptation to offensive innovations currently en vogue in the NFL.
In part one of this two-part series, I looked at some of the reasons, both schematic and personal, why Rob Ryan and his 3-4 defensive scheme were no longer tenable. Here, in the second part, we'll look at why the change might have been a wise and necessary adjustment to the NFL's changing landscape.
The first thing that must be reiterated, I think, is that firing Rob Ryan wasn't a spur-of-the-moment decision. Late last week, our own Tom Ryle wrote that:
there is some anecdotal evidence that a change was in the works as far back as the Thanksgiving loss to the Washington Redskins, when there were some quiet questions being asked about potential coaches. Despite many who assert that the recent comments by Jerry Jones concerning the early season defensive issues were just so much justification, there is evidence that Jones at least, if not others, was starting to feel that the Rob Ryan defense was not working out at least a couple of months ago.
This confirms the rumblings that have fallen on my aging ears. And I think it's more than just Jerry who was making inquiries. Indeed, the Cowboys' braintrust began to formulate a scheme change on defense no later than the Thanksgiving game, after struggling (to put it kindly) against the Redskins' read option, particularly in the second quarter.
Let me begin this line of inquiry by turning to Bob Sturm, the one local Dallas sportswriter who I believe is required reading. After viewing the divisional round of NFL playoffs (and seeing Colin Kaepernick eviscerate his beloved Packers both throwing and running), Sturm ruminates upon the future NFL landscape:
What if football was changing before your eyes in a way that made you recalculate your thoughts about a sport where Pro-Style I formation is all you hold dear?
What if Russell Wilson, Robert Griffin, Cam Newton, and Kaepernick were all here at the same time? And what if Geno Smith and Johnny Manziel appear to be next in line? Are you buying in that this is the new direction of the league or the next passing fad that will disappear soon?
What Sturm refers to here is the read option's electrifying possibilities. If you watched Green Bay struggle to contain San Francisco on Saturday, you'll easily recall how the read option abused the Packers' outside linebackers, Clay Matthews and Erik Walden, forcing them to make a decision about whether the collapse inside to help stop an interior run or set the edge to cover the quarterback run. Two weeks earlier, we saw very similar footage from Dallas' season-ending loss in Washington; Cowboys OLB DeMarcus Ware was seen repeatedly stuck in a liminal space, hovering uncomfortably between running back and quarterback, and unable to choose - and thus unable to stop - either.
Indeed, this impossible decision is precisely what the option game is designed to generate. In a recent article appearing on Grantland, Chris Brown of Smart Football fame offered up a terrific historical survey of the back-and-forth between offensive innovation and defensive scheme. With the advent of the "T formation," he writes, teams had to adapt, with the result being the old 5-2 "Monster" defense, which bears a striking resemblance to the 3-4, with its 2-gapping defensive linemen. The Monster, in turn, was beaten by a new offensive wrinkle, the wishbone (to my mind, still the prettiest offense I've ever seen):
Instead of blocking some of the Monster's 2-gap defenders, the wishbone "optioned" off them, reacting to where they went by going where they weren't. If the defensive end crashed down, the quarterback would keep the ball and run outside. Sound familiar? Against the two-gap defensive system, wishbone teams could win every time. Think about it: 2-gap lineman can't control his blocker if the blocker doesn't engage with him at all. And because the wishbone opted not to block certain defenders, it gained a numbers advantage against the rest. The Monster (read: 3-4) was out-leveraged and outnumbered, especially on the edges. Sound familiar?
As a result, Brown notes, offense ruled supreme. In 1971, for instance, the Oklahoma wishbone offense averaged a still-record 470 yards rushing per game, and continued to dominate for the better part of that decade, when Sooners coach Barry Switzer would tell his charges to "hang half a hundred" on the overwhelmed opponent. In 1979, however, Oklahoma State, a second-tier program who was getting beaten up by several wishbone teams in what was then the Big Eight conference, hired a guy named Jimmy Johnson who, as a Sooners defensive coach earlier in the decade, had gone up against that record-setting defense every day in practice. I'll let Brown tell the story from here:
Johnson's response was to reinvent the 4-3 defense with an almost entirely new underlying framework. And although this new 4-3 began at Oklahoma State, it is now known for the school Johnson brought it to next: the University of Miami. The 4-3 had been around for a long time. Legendary Dallas Cowboys coach Tom Landry even had his own variant named after him, the "Landry 4-3 Flex"; but Johnson concocted his version as anti-wishbone medicine. Instead of telling defensive linemen to 2-gap and watching them get fooled by the option on every play, he switched entirely to a 1-gap system. Johnson simplified things for them by giving them one job and telling them to attack...
In Johnson's Miami 4-3, aggressiveness, playing your assignment, and, above all else, speed, ruled...His 1-gap scheme allowed him to use smaller, faster, more athletic players. Johnson also lined his cornerbacks up near the line of scrimmage so they would be available to stop outside runs, while the safeties aligned deep. All together, Johnson's defense was sound against the wishbone. The middle linebacker covered the infamous fullback dive up the middle, while the other defenders - the defensive end, outside linebacker, safety, and cornerback - could account for the quarterback and pitch running back. Nowadays, whenever you see a defense smother a poorly run speed option on the sideline, you're seeing Johnson's principles at work.
I remember, as a young fan, watching Oklahoma face off against Johnson's Miami teams - and being alarmed by how much penetration the Hurricanes got, and how utterly disruptive their defense was to a wishbone attack that spent the rest of the season cutting through the opposition like a hot knife through butter. The Sooners fell to the ‘Canes during the 1985 and '86 seasons, as well as in the 1988 Orange Bowl to end the 1987 season. In those three years, Oklahoma went 33-3; all three losses were to Miami. They averaged 40.2 points a game in those 33 wins, but only 14.7 against Miami, with a high of 16 in 1986.
As Brown notes, Johnson's one-gap 4-3 defense, initially designed to stop the wishbone, turned out to be highly effective against a wide variety of schemes. This was not limited to college ball; his defenses in Dallas and Miami finished in the top ten five times, including first (Dallas '92), third (Miami '98) and fifth (Miami '99) place finishes. Since the NFL is a copycat league, it makes sense that the rest of the league took note; Brown proposes that "all of the ‘Tampa Two' defenses that later became popular were directly derived from [Johnson's] Miami 4-3."
The larger takeaway here is that, as it did in the early seventies in college football, the option attack has made a 2-gap defensive system largely untenable, with recent events in Washington and Green Bay just two examples in a mounting pile of evidence. Now, with the advent (or, depending on your position, return) of option concepts into the NFL game, it makes sense that teams are looking to return to the defense initially designed to stop the option.
And I think the Cowboys have been aware of this for a while. Think about it: which two games did Jerry Jones cite as those in which he thought the Cowboys defense should have played better? Seattle and Chicago - both of which play the one-gap "under" 4-3 designed by Monte Kiffin. We know, of course, that Lovie Smith was Kiffin's linebackers coach and took his system with him to Chicago. Similarly, Seattle head coach Pete Carroll, who made his name as a defensive guru, has been running the scheme since 1977, when he learned it at the University of Arkansas under, you guessed it, the Razorbacks then-DC Kiffin.
One of the enduring memories of this year's playoffs will be the toughness, confidence and speed of Carroll's young Seahawks team, particularly their defense. After Atlanta kicked a field goal to quash the ‘Hawks amazing comeback, the aforementioned Brown tweeted:
Brown's tweet confirmed what I had been thinking as I watched the Seahawks young, fast defenders make plays in the second half. Perhaps more reassuring, I think that we'll see the Cowboys defense (undersized, fast, big corners) move in the same direction in 2013 and beyond. With RGIII and Russell Wilson likely future tournament opponents, the Cowboys will have no choice if they hope to make it to the big show.
And Jimmy will be down in South Florida, with a big "I told you so" smile on his face.
http://www.bloggingtheboys.com/2013/1/15/3878820/dallas-cowboys-replace-rob-ryan-part-ii-monte-kiffin
Go Canes!
In looking over the Cowboys' decision to replace Rob Ryan with Monte Kiffin, it is clear that Ryan's 3-4, and his method of implementing it, wasn't totally in line with the way that Jason Garrett wants to conduct business. More importantly, it appears Kiffin's 4-3 may represent a key adaptation to offensive innovations currently en vogue in the NFL.
In part one of this two-part series, I looked at some of the reasons, both schematic and personal, why Rob Ryan and his 3-4 defensive scheme were no longer tenable. Here, in the second part, we'll look at why the change might have been a wise and necessary adjustment to the NFL's changing landscape.
The first thing that must be reiterated, I think, is that firing Rob Ryan wasn't a spur-of-the-moment decision. Late last week, our own Tom Ryle wrote that:
there is some anecdotal evidence that a change was in the works as far back as the Thanksgiving loss to the Washington Redskins, when there were some quiet questions being asked about potential coaches. Despite many who assert that the recent comments by Jerry Jones concerning the early season defensive issues were just so much justification, there is evidence that Jones at least, if not others, was starting to feel that the Rob Ryan defense was not working out at least a couple of months ago.
This confirms the rumblings that have fallen on my aging ears. And I think it's more than just Jerry who was making inquiries. Indeed, the Cowboys' braintrust began to formulate a scheme change on defense no later than the Thanksgiving game, after struggling (to put it kindly) against the Redskins' read option, particularly in the second quarter.
Let me begin this line of inquiry by turning to Bob Sturm, the one local Dallas sportswriter who I believe is required reading. After viewing the divisional round of NFL playoffs (and seeing Colin Kaepernick eviscerate his beloved Packers both throwing and running), Sturm ruminates upon the future NFL landscape:
What if football was changing before your eyes in a way that made you recalculate your thoughts about a sport where Pro-Style I formation is all you hold dear?
What if Russell Wilson, Robert Griffin, Cam Newton, and Kaepernick were all here at the same time? And what if Geno Smith and Johnny Manziel appear to be next in line? Are you buying in that this is the new direction of the league or the next passing fad that will disappear soon?
What Sturm refers to here is the read option's electrifying possibilities. If you watched Green Bay struggle to contain San Francisco on Saturday, you'll easily recall how the read option abused the Packers' outside linebackers, Clay Matthews and Erik Walden, forcing them to make a decision about whether the collapse inside to help stop an interior run or set the edge to cover the quarterback run. Two weeks earlier, we saw very similar footage from Dallas' season-ending loss in Washington; Cowboys OLB DeMarcus Ware was seen repeatedly stuck in a liminal space, hovering uncomfortably between running back and quarterback, and unable to choose - and thus unable to stop - either.
Indeed, this impossible decision is precisely what the option game is designed to generate. In a recent article appearing on Grantland, Chris Brown of Smart Football fame offered up a terrific historical survey of the back-and-forth between offensive innovation and defensive scheme. With the advent of the "T formation," he writes, teams had to adapt, with the result being the old 5-2 "Monster" defense, which bears a striking resemblance to the 3-4, with its 2-gapping defensive linemen. The Monster, in turn, was beaten by a new offensive wrinkle, the wishbone (to my mind, still the prettiest offense I've ever seen):
Instead of blocking some of the Monster's 2-gap defenders, the wishbone "optioned" off them, reacting to where they went by going where they weren't. If the defensive end crashed down, the quarterback would keep the ball and run outside. Sound familiar? Against the two-gap defensive system, wishbone teams could win every time. Think about it: 2-gap lineman can't control his blocker if the blocker doesn't engage with him at all. And because the wishbone opted not to block certain defenders, it gained a numbers advantage against the rest. The Monster (read: 3-4) was out-leveraged and outnumbered, especially on the edges. Sound familiar?
As a result, Brown notes, offense ruled supreme. In 1971, for instance, the Oklahoma wishbone offense averaged a still-record 470 yards rushing per game, and continued to dominate for the better part of that decade, when Sooners coach Barry Switzer would tell his charges to "hang half a hundred" on the overwhelmed opponent. In 1979, however, Oklahoma State, a second-tier program who was getting beaten up by several wishbone teams in what was then the Big Eight conference, hired a guy named Jimmy Johnson who, as a Sooners defensive coach earlier in the decade, had gone up against that record-setting defense every day in practice. I'll let Brown tell the story from here:
Johnson's response was to reinvent the 4-3 defense with an almost entirely new underlying framework. And although this new 4-3 began at Oklahoma State, it is now known for the school Johnson brought it to next: the University of Miami. The 4-3 had been around for a long time. Legendary Dallas Cowboys coach Tom Landry even had his own variant named after him, the "Landry 4-3 Flex"; but Johnson concocted his version as anti-wishbone medicine. Instead of telling defensive linemen to 2-gap and watching them get fooled by the option on every play, he switched entirely to a 1-gap system. Johnson simplified things for them by giving them one job and telling them to attack...
In Johnson's Miami 4-3, aggressiveness, playing your assignment, and, above all else, speed, ruled...His 1-gap scheme allowed him to use smaller, faster, more athletic players. Johnson also lined his cornerbacks up near the line of scrimmage so they would be available to stop outside runs, while the safeties aligned deep. All together, Johnson's defense was sound against the wishbone. The middle linebacker covered the infamous fullback dive up the middle, while the other defenders - the defensive end, outside linebacker, safety, and cornerback - could account for the quarterback and pitch running back. Nowadays, whenever you see a defense smother a poorly run speed option on the sideline, you're seeing Johnson's principles at work.
I remember, as a young fan, watching Oklahoma face off against Johnson's Miami teams - and being alarmed by how much penetration the Hurricanes got, and how utterly disruptive their defense was to a wishbone attack that spent the rest of the season cutting through the opposition like a hot knife through butter. The Sooners fell to the ‘Canes during the 1985 and '86 seasons, as well as in the 1988 Orange Bowl to end the 1987 season. In those three years, Oklahoma went 33-3; all three losses were to Miami. They averaged 40.2 points a game in those 33 wins, but only 14.7 against Miami, with a high of 16 in 1986.
As Brown notes, Johnson's one-gap 4-3 defense, initially designed to stop the wishbone, turned out to be highly effective against a wide variety of schemes. This was not limited to college ball; his defenses in Dallas and Miami finished in the top ten five times, including first (Dallas '92), third (Miami '98) and fifth (Miami '99) place finishes. Since the NFL is a copycat league, it makes sense that the rest of the league took note; Brown proposes that "all of the ‘Tampa Two' defenses that later became popular were directly derived from [Johnson's] Miami 4-3."
The larger takeaway here is that, as it did in the early seventies in college football, the option attack has made a 2-gap defensive system largely untenable, with recent events in Washington and Green Bay just two examples in a mounting pile of evidence. Now, with the advent (or, depending on your position, return) of option concepts into the NFL game, it makes sense that teams are looking to return to the defense initially designed to stop the option.
And I think the Cowboys have been aware of this for a while. Think about it: which two games did Jerry Jones cite as those in which he thought the Cowboys defense should have played better? Seattle and Chicago - both of which play the one-gap "under" 4-3 designed by Monte Kiffin. We know, of course, that Lovie Smith was Kiffin's linebackers coach and took his system with him to Chicago. Similarly, Seattle head coach Pete Carroll, who made his name as a defensive guru, has been running the scheme since 1977, when he learned it at the University of Arkansas under, you guessed it, the Razorbacks then-DC Kiffin.
One of the enduring memories of this year's playoffs will be the toughness, confidence and speed of Carroll's young Seahawks team, particularly their defense. After Atlanta kicked a field goal to quash the ‘Hawks amazing comeback, the aforementioned Brown tweeted:
Brown's tweet confirmed what I had been thinking as I watched the Seahawks young, fast defenders make plays in the second half. Perhaps more reassuring, I think that we'll see the Cowboys defense (undersized, fast, big corners) move in the same direction in 2013 and beyond. With RGIII and Russell Wilson likely future tournament opponents, the Cowboys will have no choice if they hope to make it to the big show.
And Jimmy will be down in South Florida, with a big "I told you so" smile on his face.
http://www.bloggingtheboys.com/2013/1/15/3878820/dallas-cowboys-replace-rob-ryan-part-ii-monte-kiffin
Go Canes!
Boston_Cane
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- Joined
- Nov 30, 2012
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Yeah I get that. Everything I've heard from coach D leads me to believe he schemes based on the players he has, as any coach must. He's not seeing DT's plowing into the backfield in practice and saying "no, no, no. I want you to read and react." He's working with what he has.
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