ISANDLWANA
The British Empire’s invasion of Zululand must have looked like an easy lay-up for the British general staff. English troops were armed with the Martini-Henry breech-loading rifle (capable of firing ten rounds a minute) and supported advanced heavy artillery, while Zulu troops fought with short spears, leather shields, and a handful of obsolete firearms they didn’t really know how to use.
This analysis of Zulu fighting potential failed to take into account that their people had a
remarkably well-developed understanding of strategy and movement, and that their deliberate focus on hand-to-hand combat was allied with an understanding of the need to move swiftly and with maximum surprise to within stabbing range.
A series of clever diversionary attacks drew much of the British army away from their central camp at Isandlwana, and the British commanders’ failure to adequately patrol the area allowed a huge formation of Zulu warriors to encircle the camp.
When the Zulu were finally discovered, they attacked with incredible speed and determination, overwhelming the poorly prepared British defenses, killing the 1800 troops (at this stage of the war, civilians were spared) and capturing vast amounts of rifles and ammunition.
The rout was so profound that the British had to pull back to South Africa and wait for reinforcements.
